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Searching for Stability:
Mexico's 1995 Banking System Reforms
Christopher R. Rowley*
I. Introduction.
In the last two decades, Mexico's banking system has undergone tremendous structur-
al changes. Initially, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the system transformed from a system of
large, independent banks to a system experiencing increased governmental control, culmi-
nating in the nationalization of Mexican banks in 1982. Later, in the early 1990s, the sys-
tem changed from a nationalized but noncompetitive system to a privatized but interna-
tionally isolated system. Finally, in 1994 and 1995, the system became substantially open to
foreign competition. These changes at times have severely strained the soundness and sta-
bility of Mexico's banking system.
The financial crisis triggered by Mexico's poorly-maintained fiscal, monetary, and
exchange rate policies in late 1994 forced Mexico to address the chronic weaknesses that
had developed in its banking system during the course of the various structural changes.
In early 1995, Mexico began implementing policies designed to reverse its deeply-rooted
systemic problems: inadequate capitalization; poor asset quality; chronic inefficiency due
to lack of competition; and insufficient prudential regulation and supervision.
Although such changes always take time, Mexico's efforts finally appear somewhat
successful. Mexico's financial system appears to be regaining credibility in the international
financial community and Mexico may finally be on the road to a more mature and devel-
oped financial system.
This article focuses on Mexico's efforts to regain stability in its banking system following
the financial crisis in late 1994. Part II of this article begins with a brief perspective on the his-
toric development of the Mexican banking system, which is necessary to understand the roots
of the system's systemic problems. Part III surveys the provisions of NAFTA regarding finan-
cial services and the agreement's impact on the Mexican banking system. NAFTA marked the
beginning of foreign competition into Mexico and a general optimism toward Mexico's eco-
nomic future. Part IV discusses the roots of the 1994 financial crisis, and Part V explains how
the financial crisis further weakened the banking system. Finally, Part VI explores in depth the
legal reforms and stabilization programs implemented by Mexico immediately following the
1994 financial crisis. These measures include the lifting of limits on foreign participation in
the Mexican banking system, special programs to improve bank capitalization and asset quali-
ty, and enhancement of the prudential regulation and supervision of the Mexican banking
system by Mexican authorities. The approval, by the United States Federal Reserve Board of
the Mexican financial group Grupo Financiero Banamex Accival, to operate in the United
States demonstrates at least the partial success of Mexico's stabilization efforts.
* J.D., Southern Methodist University School of Law, 1998; SMU NAFTA Centre Research Fellow.
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II. Historical Perspective on Mexican Banking System.
Mexico's movement to a more open and efficient banking system has followed an
arduous path. A brief overview of the historical forces which have shaped the Mexican
banking system allows one to appreciate the significant advances made by Mexico in
recent years.
Mexico's banking system originally developed from large, family-owned businesses in
the late 1800s.1 Despite increasing government control over the Mexican economy, which
was intended to ease the country's developing foreign debt problem,2 these powerful busi-
ness and family interests controlled the banking system into the 1970s. This system of con-
trol was a problem caused by "[e]xcessive government spending, unrestrained lending by
international financial institutions, softened demand for petroleum, worldwide recession,
and substantial appreciation of the U.S. dollar" all of which "increased Mexico's largely
dollar denominated foreign debt to an unbearable level." 3 By 1982, when Mexico faced its
first year of real economic decline since 1932,4 the Mexican Government perceived the
control of Mexican banks by Mexico's largest businesses to be an obstacle to necessary gov-
ernment control over the Mexican economy.5 Unable to pay its foreign debt and deep in
economic crisis, Mexico, under the leadership of President L6pez-Portillo, nationalized its
banks in September 1982.6
A. NATIONALIZATION.
Mexico legitimated the nationalization of its banks by amending its constitution to
decree financial services to be public services which only the Mexican Government could
provide. 7 Mexico expected the nationalization to prevent the flight of foreign capital, thus
preserving the access to capital essential for economic growth.8 The opposite result
occurred, however, as foreign capital continued to disappear and the government, bur-
dened by debt, became the primary domestic borrower, which had the effect of crowding
1. See Carlos M. Nalda, Note, NAFTA, Foreign Investment and the Mexican Banking System, 26 GEO.
WASH. 1. INT'L L. & ECON. 379, 384 (1996) (citing RUSSELL N. WHITE, STATE, CLASS, AND THE
NATIONALIZATION OF THE MEXICAN BANKS 86,92 n.2 (1992)).
2. See id. at 385 (citing Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Expropriation and Aftermath: The Prospects for Foreign
Enterprise in the Mexico of Miguel de la Madrid, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 431, 440 (1983); WHITE, supra
note 1, at 71-89).
3. Nalda, supra note 1, at 385 (citing Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by
Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations: Phase I Recent Trade and
Investment Reforms Undertaken by Mexico and Implications for the United States, 5-1 (USITC Doc.
2275 (Apr. 1990)).
4. See William Gruben & John H. Welch, Distortions and Resolutions in Mexico's Financial System, in
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF MEXICO: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 63, 64 (Laura
Randall ed., 1996).
5. See Nalda, supra note 1, at 384 (citing Murphy, supra note 2, at 441; White, supra note 1, at 71
89).
6. See Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 64; Nalda supra note 1, at 385 (citing Decreto que Establece
la Nacionalizacion de la Banca Privada, D.O., Sept. 1, 1982 (Mex.)).
7. See Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 64; Nalda, supra note 1, at 385.
8. See Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 64; Nalda, supra note 1, at 386.
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out private domestic borrowers. 9 Mexico's banking industry faced serious problems, not
the least of which was "regulatory laxity."'10
B. PRIVATIZATION.
Full scale nationalization of Mexico's financial sector endured only a short time. In
1982, newly elected President Miguel de la Madrid began, almost immediately, the partial
privatization of Mexican banks. In December 1984, Miguel de la Madrid authorized the
sale of stock that represented thirty-four percent ownership of Mexican bank assets.I The
stock, denominated "Series B" shares, was available to the Mexican government, govern-,
ment entities, Mexican bank workers, and Mexican bank customers;12 the Mexican gov-
ernment itself retained stock denominated "Series A" shares, representing sixty-six percent
ownership of Mexican bank assets. 13 Mexican law prohibited foreign investors from
acquiring Series B shares. 14 Miguel de la Madrid continued this partial privatization in
1984 when he began the sale of non-bank financial institutions, as well as bank property
not associated with traditional deposit and lending functions. 15 This sale marked a tempo-
rary movement away from the universal banking system that had developed in Mexico
prior to the 1982 nationalization. 16
In December 1988, Carlos Salinas de Gortari succeeded Miguel de la Madrid as
President. Salinas brought with him a plan for comprehensive economic reforms designed
to make the Mexican economy "more open, efficient and competitive."17 Among the prior-
ity reforms of Salinas were the privatization and promotion of foreign investment in the
Mexican banking industry. 18 In accordance with the Salinas' plan, Mexico amended its
constitution in 1990 to allow the full privatization of its banking industry. 19
The laws implementing Mexican bank privatization permitted foreign minority par-
ticipation in Mexican banks.20 The new bank ownership regime created three types of
stock in Mexican banks which could be exchanged for existing shares: Series A shares,
Series B shares, and Series C shares. Series A shares represented fifty-one percent owner-
ship in a Mexican bank, and could be held only by Mexican nationals and financial hold-
ing companies. Series B shares could represent a maximum of forty-nine percent owner-
ship and could be held only by Mexican nationals, Mexican financial holding companies,
and Mexican private corporations. Series C shares could represent a maximum of thirty
9. See Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 64-65.
10. See id. at 64.
11. See Nalda, supra note 1, at 387 (citing Ley Reglamentaria del Servicio Publico de Banca y Credito,
D.O., Dec. 31, 1982 (Mex.)).
12. See id. at 387, n.63.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 387.
15. See Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 65.
16. See id. at 65-66.
17. GAO, Mexico's Financial Crisis: Origins, Awareness, Assistance, and Initial Efforts to Recover,
Doc. No. GGD-96-56, at 31 (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter Mexico's Financial Crisis].
18. See Nalda, supra note 1, at 390.
19. See Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 65.
20. See Nalda, supra note 1, at 390 (citing Decreto, D.O., Dec. 27, 1989 (Mex.)).
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percent ownership 2' and could be held by foreign investors. Mexican law also limited for-
eign participation on the board of directors of a Mexican corporation, thus undesirably
(from a foreign investor's perspective) restricting a foreign investor's participation in a
Mexican bank's management decisions. 22
The sale of Mexico's eighteen nationalized banks to private owners was extraordinarily
successful. This sale raised $12.4 billion by its completion in July 1992. The proceeds were
used by the government to reduce the debt remaining from the economic crises of the
1980s.23 The salient feature of Mexico's newly privatized banking industry, however, was a
lack of competition. 24 Market power was heavily concentrated in only twenty Mexican
banks, three of which held three-fifths of all Mexican bank assets. 25 Market penetration
was very low. Mexico had only one branch bank per every 18,000 people while the United
States had one branch bank per every 4,000 people. 26 Although Mexican bank profits were
quite high, due to loan interest rates that were significantly higher than the cost of funds,
the efficiency of Mexican banks was chronically low.27
The prospect of increased competition, however, lit the horizon. In 1993, Mexico fur-
ther opened its banking industry by permitting the charter of new domestic banks. This
action spawned seventeen new banks by 1994.28 More market entrants followed in 1994
after the opening of the Mexican banking system to foreign banks, as required by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA or the "agreement"). 29
III. NAFTA Liberalization of Financial Services.
NAFTA, negotiated between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, took effect on
Janunary 1, 1994. The primary practical achievement of NAFTA in the area of financial
services was to secure an agreement from Mexico to gradually open its financial services
market to foreign participation; a market which had been dosed to significant foreign par-
ticipation for over fifty years. 30
21. See id. at 391 (citing Ley de Instituciones de Credito, D.O., July 19, 1990, arts. 11, 14 (Mex.)).
22. See id. at 391 (citing Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera,
D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 (Mex.), reprinted and translated in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DispuTEs, INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: MEXICO (1989).
23. See id. at 392 (citing James R. Kraus, Mexico's Privatized Bank Sector Ripe with Plums, AM.
BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 14A); Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 66.




28. See id. at 67.
29. See id.
30. Citibank, by special arrangement with the Mexican government, was the only foreign bank per-
mitted to operate in Mexico prior to the passage of NAFTA. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in
Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 149 (1995); Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Financial Services Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement An Overview, 28 INT'L LAw. 291 (1994).
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A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVISIONS.
Summarizing the most important provisions of the complicated agreement, NAFTA
requires the three countries to adhere to the national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment principles when imposing laws or regulations on foreign financial service
firms.3 1 The agreement also, in a broad sense, requires the countries to ensure market
access and transparency of regulation, and permit certain trade in cross-border financial
services. 3 2 The agreement is subject to various reservations (provisions by a member
country preserving existing laws or regulations not conforming with NAFTA require-
ments) and exclusions (provisions allowing for future actions inconsistent with NAFTA
requirments) by each of the NAFTA countries.33 The most important exclusion permitted
to each NAFTA country is the prudential "carve-out." This concept is an arrangement per-
mitting future actions inconsistent with NAFTA requirements that are implemented for
safety and soundness (or prudential) regulation, for regulation of monetary and credit
policy, or for regulation of exchange rate policies. 34
B. TREATMENT OF MEXICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES.
Under NAFTA, foreign investors may establish a subsidiary (as opposed to a direct
branch) in Mexico by acquiring an existing, chartered Mexican financial institution or
by applying to establish their own chartered Mexican financial institution. 35 Once a for-
eign investor establishes such a subsidiary, the investor may form a Mexican group hold-
ing company that is capable of establishing or acquiring other Mexican companies
engaged in providing financial services.36 Through its group holding company, a foreign
investor may expand its business to provide any financial service that a domestic
Mexican investor could provide under Mexican law. 37 Such financial services include
31. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Dec. 17, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see generally Bachman,
supra note 30 (a comprehensive discussion of the NAFTA financial services provisions). NAFTA
applies to a variety of financial entities which are precisely defined in the Agreement, including
"financial institution[s]" "financial service providerls]" and "investorls]." See NAFTA, art. 1416,
32 I.L.M. at 661. Banking institutions, which are the primary focus of this article, fall under the
NAFTA definition of "financial institution" - an entity "authorized to do business and regulated
or supervised as a financial institution under the laws of the party in whose territory it is locat-
ed." Id. A "financial service provider," on the other hand, is an entity "engaged in the business of
providing a financial service" whether or not the financial service is regulated or supervised. Id.;
Bachman, supra note 30, at 293. An "investor" is any person or entity (public or private) "that
seeks to make, makes, or has made an investment"- an "investment" being essentially "any inter-
est in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise."
NAFTA, arts. 1139 32 I.L.M. 647, 1416 32 I.L.M. 661. The terms in this article are used generally,
and the provisions of the Agreement should be consulted when determining their applicability.
32. See Bachman, supra note 30, at 292.
33. SeeNAFTA, supra note 31, arts. 1409 32 I.L.M. at 659, 1410 32 I.L.M. at 659.
34. Seeid. art. 1410 32 I.L.M. at 659.
35. See id. annex VII(B)-Mex. 32 I.L.M. at 769; see generally Bachman, supra note 30, at 305 (dis-
cussing establishment of financial institution subsidiaries in Mexico).
36. See NAFTA, supra note 31, annex VlI(C)(5)-Mex., 32 1.L.M. at 770.
37. See id.
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banking, securities, insurance, factoring, leasing, bonding, and warehousing. 38
Mexico's. reservations require that foreign investors requesting entrance to the
Mexican market to have previously provided similar financial services in the foreign
investor's home country.39 Mexico also reserved the right to prohibit foreign investors
from owning more than one Mexican financial institution of each type, as well as the right
to require a foreign investor to wholly-own any financial institutions which it establishes
or acquires in Mexico (other than an insurance company).40
C. GRADUAL FOREIGN ACCESS TO MExico: FOREIGN PARTICIPATION LIMITS.
Although NAFTA achieved significantly greater access to the Mexican financial ser-
vices market, Mexico, in an attempt to protect its newly privatized banking industry from
intense international competition, drafted its reservations to the Agreement to ensure that
increased foreign access would occur gradually. Most importantly, Mexico's reservations
provide that access to the Mexican market will be phased in over a six year period between
January 1, 1994 and January 1, 2000 for banking, securities, and insurance services.4 1 The
agreement achieves this gradual access with capital and asset limits imposed on foreign
financial firms. For both individual foreign firms and for the aggregate of all foreign firms
within certain categories of financial institutions (i.e., banking, securities, or insurance),
the Mexican reservation limits the amount of capital or assets that a foreign firm may hold
as a percentage of the total capital of all financial institutions of that category in Mexico. 42
The aggregate capital limit for banks owned by foreign investors began at eight per-
cent in 1994, with the limit increasing to fifteen percent in 1999. 43 The individual institu-
tion capital limit is 1.5 percent throughout the period.44 Additionally, a foreign investor
may not acquire a Mexican bank if the capital of the acquired bank and any other Mexican
banks owned by the acquiror would exceed four percent of the aggregate capital of all
Mexican banks.45 There is also a provision that permits Mexico to extend or freeze the
aggregate capital limit for all foreign owned banks, in certain circumstances, for up to
three years until the year 2004.46 If at any time, the aggregate capital of all foreign owned,
banks in Mexico exceeds twenty-five percent of the aggregate capital of all banks in
Mexico, Mexico may require consultations with the United States and Canada to discuss
the need for appropriate action.47
The limits apply in a similar fashion to securities and insurance firms owned by for-
eign investors. The aggregate capital limit for securities firms owned by foreign investors
38. See id. annex VII(5)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
39. See id. annex VII(B)(14)(a)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
40. See id. annex VII(B)(14)(b)-Mex., (B)(12)-Mex., 32 L.L.M. at 770.
41. See id. annex VII(B)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
42. See id. annex VII(B)(2), (5), (6)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770; see generally Bachman, supra note 30, at
307.
43. See id. annex VII(B)(5)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
44. See id. annex VII(B)(2)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
45. See id. annex VII(B)(13)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
46. See id.
47. See id. annex 1413.6(B) 32 I.L.M. at 662,VII(B)(9) 32 I.L.M. at 770, (C)(Definitions)-Mex., 32
I.L.M. at 772.
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began at ten percent, and will increase to twenty percent by 1999.48 The individual institu-
tion capital limit for securities firms is four percent. 49 The aggregate capital limit for insur-
ance firms owned by foreign investors began at six percent and will increase to twelve per-
cent by 1999.50 The individual institution capital limit for insurance companies is 1.5 per-
cent.
51
D. ENTRY OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL FiRMS INTO MEXICO.
Shortly after the effective date of NAFTA, large numbers of foreign banks applied for
permission to enter the Mexican financial services market. By August 1994, Mexico had
received applications from 102 foreign financial services providers; it formally approved
fifty-four financial services providers to begin operations in Mexico on October 17,
1994.52 Although Mexico was one of the most underbanked economies in the world and
"desperately in need of more financial services,' 53 the individual and aggregate capital lim-
its imposed by NAFTA limited what might have been greater direct foreign investment by
preventing most foreign banks from pursuing retail banking in Mexico, potentially a very
profitable business.5 4 Instead, the firms generally intended to focus on more sophisicated
financial services where they held clear competitive advantages. 55
IV. Mexico's 1994 Financial Crisis.
In December 1994, eleven months after the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico
plunged into a severe financial crisis caused by complex financial, economic, and political
forces.56 The financial crisis forced Mexico to implement unanticipated measures in an
attempt to stabilize the country's banking system.
Although the roots of the financial crisis are complicated, they are worth exploring
briefly. In early 1994, buoyed by general approval of NAFTA, foreign investor's perceived
48. See id. annex VII(B)(5)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
49. See id annex VII(B)(2)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
50. See id. annex VII(B)(6)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
51. See id. annex VII(B)(2)-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 770.
52. See More than 100 Financial Companies Have Applied to do Business in Mexico, BANKING DAILY
(BNA) (Aug. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Business in Mexico]; Fifty-Four Foreign Financial Firm
Applications Are Approved by Mexico, BANKING DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Firm
Applications].
53. See Business in Mexico, supra note 52.
54. See Firm Applications, supra note 52. Mexico Fires the Starting Gun, THE BANKER, (Dec. 1994).
55. See Mexico Fires the Starting Gun, supra note 54.
56. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 9; see also Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS,
AND POLICY ISSUES (Aug. 1995) at 53-64 [hereinafter Int'l Capital Markets]. For other discussions
of the roots of Mexico's 1994 financial crisis, see Gruben & Welch, supra note 4, at 69-71; William
C. Gruben & Robert McComb, Liberalization, Privatization, and Crash: Mexico's Banking System
in the 1990's, ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, First Quarter 1997, at
21; Douglas W. Arner, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for the Regulation of Financial
Markets, 2 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 28 (1996).
Summer 1998 37
the Mexican economy as "fundamentally strong." Accordingly, Mexico experienced a heavy
inflow of foreign investment.57 This inflow of foreign investment, however, substantially
consisted of equity and debt portfolio investments that tended to be liquid and relatively
short term, all of which were investments capable of being very quickly withdrawn. 58
This substantial foreign investment allowed Mexico to support a very large deficit in its
current accounts. 59 This action was permitted, because Mexico maintained plentiful foreign
currency reserves, it experienced rapid growth in exports, and there appeared to be little risk
of Mexico not being able to attract and retain foreign investment in the near future.60
Normally, a country must act to reduce a current account deficit by adjusting its monetary
policy, fiscal policy, or its exchange rate system.6 1 Mexico could have taken several measures
to reduce such a current account deficit, including: (1) attracting more foreign capital; (2)
allowing its currency to depreciate, thus making imports more expensive and exports cheap-
er; (3) tightening monetary and/or fiscal policy to reduce the demand for all goods, includ-
ing imports; and (4) using foreign exchange reserves to cover the deficit. 62
In 1994, due partly to this current account deficit, Mexico permitted a "growing
inconsistency" between its monetary and fiscal policy and its exchange rate system. This
inconsistency would have required Mexico to either raise interest rates or devalue the peso
(for which Mexico maintained an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar). 63 Due to its
upcoming presidential election, Mexico hesitated to take either of these actions.64
Throughout the year, several internal events further complicated Mexico's financial situa-
tion, and caused the rapid withdrawal of large amounts of liquid foreign investment from
Mexico. First, in March 1994 the assassination of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo
Colosio rattled the confidence of foreign investors and triggered a tremendous outflow of for-
eign capital .65 Then, in November and December 1994, renewed fighting in the Mexican State
of Chiapas and the developing scandal regarding another assassination, that of PI Secretary
General Francisco Ruiz Massieu, triggered a second outflow of foreign capital. 66 Mexico's for-
eign currency reserves, which are essential to both maintain the peso's dollar-pegged exchange
rate and cover the country's current account deficit, quickly began to fall. 67 Mexico took sev-
eral actions to lessen the outflow of foreign capital, including depreciating the peso, securing a
short-term credit agreement with the United States and Canada, and increasing interest rates
on short-term, peso-denominated, government debt, called "cetes' 68
57. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 9; Arner, supra note 56, at 33.
58. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 9; Arner, supra note 56, at 34.
59. A country's current account measures its international trade in goods and services. It is primarily
composed of the country's balance of trade-the difference between merchandise exports and
imports-along with transfer payments and short-term credit. See Mexico's Financial Crisis,
supra note 17, at 156; see also Barron's Dictionary of Business Terms 140 (1994).
60. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 5.
61. Seeid. at5n.7.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 5.
64. See id.; see Arner, supra note 56, at 35.
65. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 9.
66. See id. at 11.
67. See id. at 9; see Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 26.
68. See Arner, supra note 56, at 56; see Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 9-10.
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As 1994 progressed, however, investors became increasingly concerned about the pos-
sibility of a large currency devaluation necessary to stabilize Mexico's financial situation.69
In order to alleviate these concerns, Mexico opted to increase its issuance of short-term,
dollar-denominated debt called "tesobonos,' rather than take action which might have
dampened Mexico's economy, such as increasing interest rates, reducing government
expenditures, or devaluing the peso.70 Tesobonos guaranteed an investor's repayment in
pesos sufficient to cover the dollar value of his investment, thus protecting the investor in
the event of a devaluation. 71 The issuance of these tesobonos, with short maturities and
purchased primarily by portfolio investors willing to switch to other, less risky investments
if they perceived a possible default or potential for higher returns, left Mexico's foreign
currency reserves vulnerable in the event of an outflow of foreign capital. 72
Mexico's financial situation failed to improve, and it became apparent that Mexico's
financial stability required an adjustment in monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. 73
Mexico continued to lose investor confidence and foreign currency reserves when it failed
to adopt appropriate monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies following the renewed
fighting in Chiapas and the developing Ruiz Massieu scandal. 74 Circumstances forced
Mexico to completely devalue its currency on December 22, 1994. 75 The devaluation
resulted in outflows of foreign capital, high inflation, and ultimately, a severe downturn in
the Mexican economy.76
V. Weakening of the Mexican Banking System.
Mexico's financial crisis exacerbated weaknesses in Mexico's banking sector. Mexico's
banks experienced weakness following their privatization under the Salinas administration.
First, buyers purchased privatized banks at very high prices, requiring strong future perfor-.
mance for them to remain financially sound.77 Second, the government, ineffective at evalu-
ating the creditworthiness of borrowers, passed on to buyers serious loan portfolio problems
and an ever increasing loan default rate. 78 A perceived strong economy and the tremendous
inflow of foreign capital following NAFTA temporarily disguised these problems, as "[t] he
problem during a strong economic upturn ... is that the abundance of liquidity masks risky
borrowers who would be recognized for what they are in less risky times "' 79
69. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 10.
70. See id.
71. Seeid.
72. See Arner, supra note 56, at 54-56; see Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 10.
73. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 11.
74. See Arner, supra note 56, at 57, Table 18; See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 11- 12.
75. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 12.
76. See Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
77. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 143; Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 26.
78. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 143; Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 26.
79. Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 26 (paraphrasing Ricardo Hausmann & Michael Gavin,
The Roots of Banking Crises: The Macroeconomic Context, paper presented at the Congerence on
Banking Crises in Latin America, Inter-American Development Bank, Wash. D.C., Oct. 6, 1995).
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In addition to ineffective evaluation of borrower creditworthiness, there were other
regulatory problems in Mexico's banking system. Regulation of Mexico's developing univer-
sal banking system was among those problems. The regulation dealt poorly with self-lend-
ing among financial groups, making it difficult for regulators to prevent questionable inter-
nal lending. 80 Mexico's accounting standards did not provide for consolidated reporting,
which might have helped regulators assess possible self-lending.8 1 Additionally, Mexico's
banks experienced inadequate capitalization levels prior to and following privatization.8 2
With the devaluation of the peso, the outflow of foreign capital, and the ensuing eco-
nomic downturn, Mexico's banking system faced tremendous stress. First, with the outflow
of U.S. dollars, Mexican banks had insufficient dollar liquidity necessary to meet their dol-
lar obligations that created an "immediate dollar liquidity problem."83 Second, Mexican
banks maintained significant dollar-denominated debt, and as the peso continued to
decline in value against the dollar, the capitalization levels of Mexican banks also
declined. 84 Finally, as Mexico's interest rates rose, so did the already high rate of nonper-
forming loans held by Mexican banks. 85
VI. Mexico's 1995 Banking Law Reforms and Programs.
To prevent financial collapse, Mexico had to immediately increase the capitalization
and improve the asset quality of its banking system. Mexico quickly acted to implement
programs, policies, and laws designed to achieve banking system stability. Measures imple-
mented by Mexico included an overhaul of the laws governing foreign participation in its
banking system, special government programs to improve bank capitalization and asset
quality, and measures to improve the prudential regulation and supervision of its banks.
A. FOREIGN PARTICIPATION.
A large part of Mexico's strategy to infuse new foreign capital into its banking system
involved amending its banking laws to permit and encourage increased foreign investment
in Mexican banks. Mexico unilaterally amended its Credit Institutions Law (Ley de
Instituciones de Credito), its Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores), and its
Law to Regulate Financial Groups (Ley para Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras) on
February 16, 1995 (collectively, the "1995 amendments"),8 6 and committed itself to open-
ing its economy.8 7 The legislation effectively nullified the foreign capital limitations estab-
80. See id. at 26.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 25-26.
83. Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 143.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See "Decreto Que Reforma, Adiciona y Deroga Disposiciones de ]a Ley para Regular
Agrupaciones Financieras, de la Ley de Instituciones de Credito, y de la Ley del Mercado de
Valores" D.O. Feb. 15, 1995 (Mex.) [hereinafter 1995 Amendments]; see generally John E. Rogers
& Adrian Zubikarai A., Recent Changes to Mexican Controls on Foreign Investment in Financial
Institutions, Banking Rep. (BNA) Vol. 64, No. 19 (May 8, 1995).
87. See Mexican Banking Laws Allow More Foreign Participation, Banking Daily (BNA) (Feb. 1, 1995).
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lished in NAFTA88 and represented a "dramatic change" in Mexico's previous position,
since access to Mexico's financial services market had been "one of the most controversial
issues in the NAFTA negotiations' 8 9
1. Foreign Bank Subsidiaries.
Mexican law, immediately following NAFTA, allowed foreign investment in Mexican
banks by two methods: (1) as a subsidiary of a foreign financial institution, and (2) by a
minority investment in a Mexican majority-owned bank.90 For foreign subsidiaries, the
individual capital limits, established in NAFTA and adopted as Mexican law, limited the
foreign bank subsidiary to 1.5 percent of the total capital of Mexican banks.9 1 The aggre-
gate capital limits limited all foreign bank subsidiaries to between eight and fifteen percent
of the total capital of Mexican banks.92 Mexican law also required these foreign sub-
sidiaries to be ninety-nine percent owned by the foreign financial institution.93
The 1995 amendments significantly altered these requirements. First, the amendments
increased the individual capital limit for subsidiaries to six percent, well above the 1.5 per-
cent limit under NAFTA. This action effectively allowed all but three of Mexico's largest
banks (Banco Nacional de Mexico, Bancomer, and Banca Serfin) to be acquired as sub-
sidiaries. 94 Second, the amendments increased the aggregate capital limit to twenty-five
percent, well above the maximum limit under NAFTA of fifteen percent. 95 Finally, the
amendments abandon the requirement that a foreign financial institution own at least
ninety-nine percent of its Mexican subsidiary.96 Instead, the foreign financial institution's
ownership of its Mexican subsidiary can be as low as fifty-one percent-allowing the sub-
sidiary to invite participation of Mexican or other foreign investors at a level of up to
forty-nine percent ownership.9 7
The foreign financial institution's ownership of a subsidiary is represented by
"Series F" shares, while the remaining ownership (up to forty-nine percent) is repre-
sented by "Series B" shares. 98 Individual investors are limited to maximum ownership
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 7.
91. See NAFTA discussion, supra note 31, § III1C.
92. See id.
93. See Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 7.
94. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, art. 17; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note
86, at 7; see William Acworth, Mexican Congress Affirms Open Door Policy, THOMSON'S INT'L
BANKING REG., Vol. 7, No. 5, Feb. 6, 1995, at 3.
95. See 1995 Amendments, Articulos Transitorios, Second, supra note 86; see also Rogers &
Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 7.
96. See Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 7.
97. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, art. 45-G; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra
note 86, at 7, 10.
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of five percent of Series B shares, with the possibility that regulators may approve up to
twenty percent ownership. 99
2. Foreign Minority Ownership of Mexican Banks.
For foreign investors making minority investments in Mexican majority-owned banks,
prior Mexican law limited such investments to thirty percent of bank ownership.100 The law
limited individuals to five percent of bank ownership, with the possibility of regulator
approval for up to ten percent ownership. 101 This ownership could be represented by either
"Series C" shares or special "Series L" shares that had limited voting rights.' 0 2
The 1995 amendments significantly altered these foreign minority investment owner-
ship requirements. The amendments increased the percent ownership that could be acquired
as a minority investment to forty-nine percent (from thirty percent).103 These minority
investments are not subject to any of the capital limits for subsidiaries, either individual or
aggregate. 10 4 As under previous law, however, there are individual ownership limits of five
percent. 105 However, the 1995 amendments extended to twenty percent (from ten percent)
the individual ownership limit that may be obtained with regulator approval. 10 6
The amendments eliminate Series C shares (formerly representing foreign ownership
of a bank), so that stock of foreign minority investors is now represented by Series B
shares. They also allow foreign "institutional investors" to acquire the Mexican-owned
majority shares, Series A shares. 10 7 With this arrangement, it is conceivable for foreign
investors to obtain some degree of control over a Mexican bank if institutional investors
substantially owned Series A shares of the bank combined with individual foreign
investors (each holding less than five percent ownership, or twenty percent with regulator
approval) owning forty-nine percent. 108
98. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, art. 17; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note
86, at 7.
99. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, art. 17; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note
86, at 7.
100. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-17; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 6.
101. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-17; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 6.
102. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-17; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 6.
103. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-15; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 7-8.
104. See Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 9.
105. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-15; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8.
106. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-15; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8.
107. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-15; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8.
108. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 11-15; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 18-20; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8, 10.
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3. Corporate Governance Changes.
The 1995 amendments also make several changes relating to corporate governance.
First, previous Mexican law allowed foreign subsidiaries to maintain boards consisting of
only five directors. 109 Now, however, foreign subsidiaries that opt to own less than ninety-
nine percent of their stock must have eleven directors (or a multiple of eleven, i.e., twenty-
two, thirty-three, etc.).I 1 0 Additionally, Mexican law previously required that directors rep-
resenting Series A or Series B shares be Mexican nationals or immigrants residing in
Mexico.1 11 However, for Series A shares, the new law eliminates the requirement that
directors residing in Mexico must have immigrants status, though it retains the require-
ment that they reside in Mexico. 112 For Series B shares, directors no longer must reside in
Mexico, although the legislation retains the requirement that a majority of the directors of
any subsidiary must reside in Mexico. 113
B. SPECIAL PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE BANK CAPITALIZATION AND ASSET QUALITY.
To further address the capitalization and asset quality problems in the Mexican bank-
ing system, created by the 1994 financial crisis, the Mexican central bank (Banco de
Mexico) and Mexico's bank regulators implemented several innovative and specialized
programs. Banking experts generally credit these programs with having initially stabilized
the Mexican banking system.114
1. Capitalization.
As well as changing its foreign participation limits, Mexico implemented a temporary
bank recapitalization program (Programa de Capacitacion Temporal, or PROCAPTE) in
February 1995. PROCAPTE is a voluntary recapitalization program for banks whose capi-
talization levels fall below the capitalization standards of the Basle Accord--eight percent
of risk-weighted assets. 115 A bank participating in PROCAPTE issues subordinated con-
109 See Ley de'Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 45-K; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 27-L; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8.
110. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 45-K; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, arts. 27-L; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8.
111. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 23; see Ley Para Regular Agrupaciones
Financieras, supra note 86, art. 25; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86, at 8.
112. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 23, 45-K; see Ley Para Regular
Agrupaciones Financieras, supra note 86, art. 25, 27-L; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86,
at 8.
113. See Ley de Instituciones de Credito, supra note 86, arts. 23, 45-K; see Ley Para Regular
Agrupaciones Financieras, supra note 86, art. 25, 27-L; see also Rogers & Zubikarai, supra note 86,
at 8.
114. See William P. Osterberg, The Hidden Costs of Mexican Banking Reform, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
CLEVELAND, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY, Jan. 1, 1997, at 5; see Roy A. Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano,
Symposium-The New Latin American Debt Regime - Mexico's Banks After the December 1994
Devaluation-A Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 J. INT'L L. Bus. 24,39 (1995).
115. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 144; see Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
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vertible debentures which are then purchased by the deposit insurance authority of
Mexico's central bank (Fondo Bancario de Proteccion al Ahorro, or FOBOPROA). 116 The
bank issues the debentures in an amount sufficient to raise its capitalization to nine per-
cent. 117 Banks participating in PROCAPTE must repay their debt within five years, other-
wise FOBOPROA will convert the debt to equity and sell the equity on the private mar-
ket.118 There are also provisions allowing FOBOPROA to convert the debt to equity if a
bank is poorly managed or is likely to become insolvent. 119
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), six Mexican banks entered
the PROPCAPTE program. 120 The banks issued $1 billion in convertible debentures and
Mexico's third largest bank, Banca Serfin, left the program in June 1995.121
2. Asset Quality.
In early 1995, Mexico took several steps to address the increase in nonperforming
loans brought on by the 1994 financial crisis. First, Mexico required banks to maintain
higher levels of loan loss reserves as protection against losses from nonperforming
loans.1 22 New regulations required banks to maintain an amount of loan loss reserves the
larger of either sixty percent of all past due loans or four percent of total loan portfolio.1 23
Second, Mexico implemented a loan restructuring program designed to spread over
time the impact of current losses from nonperforming loans, increasing the probability
that the loans would perform, despite Mexico's high inflation and interest rates. 124 The
program allowed banks to restructure certain types of past-due private debt (i.e., commer-
cial loans and mortgages) into quasi-bond instruments which were then purchased by the
government. 125 The government then issued special bonds to finance the purchase of the
restructured debt from the banks.1 26 Finally, the banks repurchased the bonds issued by
the government, which were denominated in "Unidades de Inversion" (UDIs)-units
indexed to the consumer price index so as to preserve the real value of the principal.1 27
The restructuring system also extended the maturity of the loans by allowing loan repay-
ments to be extended and weighted to the end of the loan. 128
In addition to these programs, Mexico received a $1.7 billion loan from the World
Bank to recapitalize FOBOPROA, Mexico's deposit insurance authority, and enable it to
purchase assets and effectively resolve failing financial institutions.129 More importantly to
Mexico's ability to maintain high asset quality in the future, the World Bank and other
116. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 144; see Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
117. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 144; see Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
118. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 144; see Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
119. See Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
120. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 144.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 145.
123. See id.
124. See Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27; Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 145.
125. See Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
126. See id.
127. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 145; Gruben & McComb, supra note 56, at 27.
128. See Mexico's Financial Crisis, supra note 17, at 145.
129. See id.
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international institutions provided Mexico technical assistance on how to improve
Mexico's prudential regulation and supervision of its banking system. 130
C. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION.
1. Mexico's National Banking and Securities Commission.
Mexico recognized, following the 1994 financial crisis and the accompanying bank
capitalization and asset quality problems, that stabilization of its banking system would
require strengthening of the prudential regulation and supervision of its financial sec-
tor.13 1 To achieve this goal, Mexico drafted, and in May 1995, enacted legislation merging
the National Banking Commission and the National Securities Commission that were pre-
viously separate administrative agencies responsible for regulating banking and securities
industries.132 The new law (Ley de la Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) created
the National Banking and Securities Commission (in Spanish, forming the acronym
CNBV) to regulate Mexico's financial system. 133 The primary goal of this merger was to
"facilitate the effective supervision of financial groups on a consolidated basis by placing
the supervisors of Mexico's brokerage houses under the same roof as the supervisors of
their bank affiliates." 134 This approach makes sense given the regulatory problems associ-
ated with a universal banking system such as exists in Mexico.
The CNBV's objective is to ensure the stability of Mexico's financial system as indicat-
ed by factors such as adequate capitalization, liquidity, reserves and profitability, and by
high asset quality and capable management of financial institutions. 135 The CNBV's
Institutional Program 1997-2000 (Institutional Program) describes in detail the CNBV's
agenda for achieving these goals through the use of prudential regulation, supervision,
market self-regulation, and corrective actions. 136
a. Prudential Regulation.
The Institutional Program recognizes that financial institutions must have "internal
control systems"-or prudential regulation-that will limit excessive risk taking during
both strong and weak economic periods. 137 Because of the disjointed development of its
financial system, Mexico developed different prudential regulation schemes for its different
types of financial institutions. 138 The Institutional Program strives to develop a uniform
system of prudential regulation for Mexico's universal banking system.139 This includes
130. See id.
131. See National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico, Institutional Program 1997-2000 3
(last modified Feb. 17, 1997) <http://www.cnbv.gob.mx/cnbv/pestratege.htm> [hereinafter
Institutional Program].
132. See id. at 3.
133. See id.
134. Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 114, at 29 (emphasis added).
135. See Institutional Program, supra note 131, at 5.
136. See id. at 5-12.




the development of uniform "norms, procedures and mandatory minimum standards" for
capital adequacy levels, reserves levels, assessment of credit and investment portfolio risk,
accounting principles, and the timely and accurate disclosure of information - in essence,
uniform standards for measuring financial institution performance. 14 0
For instance, although Mexico's minimum capital adequacy requirement is eight per-
cent for banks, a level consistent with international standards, Mexico's capital adequacy
standards previously focused on credit risk, rather than market risks such as interest rate
risk and exchange risk. 14 1 To address this problem, CNBV issued new "Rules for
Capitalization Requirements in Commercial Banking Institutions and Brokerage Houses"
which now account for those market risks. 142 The CNBV plans other changes to Mexico's
capital adequacy rules as well.
The CNBV has also modernized accounting principles applicable to Mexican financial
institutions, which previously differed depending on the type of financial institution and
in some cases differed from international accounting standards. 143 Such differences made
it difficult to assess the consolidated position of Mexican financial institutions as well as
for foreign investors to compare Mexican financial institutions with other financial institu-
tions around the world.144 Mexico now uses international accounting standards and
applies them uniformly to its financial institutions.145
b. Financial Supervision.
In order to implement the CNBV's prudential regulation policies, the Institutional
Program recognizes that it must have "methodologies and procedures" for financial super-
vision that will allow CNBV "to verify that the institutions carry out their activities in con-
formity with the rules and regulations and with sound financial practices, to objectively
measure their risks, and [to] evaluate the quality of their internal controls."146 Again,
Mexico's developing universal banking system created supervision problems in the past,
however, CNBV has now implemented consolidated supervision that allows for improved
monitoring of both individual institutions and financial groups as a whole. 147
The CNBV has developed a comprehensive "consolidated supervision scheme" called
"MACRO" consisting of on-site inspections and routine off-site monitoring of financial
institutions. 148 The program evaluates a financial insitution's management of funds, capi-
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Very significantly, regarding on-site inspections, the CNBV has eliminated the practice
of permanently placing inspectors within financial institutions in favor of using groups of
inspectors officed outside of financial institutions that carry out regular inspections - a
change which makes the inspection process more effective. 150 The on-site inspectors are
responsible for ensuring that financial institutions maintain an "efficient internal control
system for risk-management" based on the inspector's first-hand observance of an institu-
tion's "operations, procedures, internal controls, management and compliance with rules
and regulations" 151 An institution must maintain manuals establishing clear policies that
demonstrate a low tolerance for excessive risk taking, as well as procedures ensuring that
an institution's employees comply with these policies.15 2
The primary focus of the CNBV's off-site inspection is the development of its
"Financial Analysis System" (in Spanish, forming the acronym SAF). 153 The SAF is a com-
puter database which receives financial information directly from financial institutions,
eliminating the need for physical delivery of the information that financial institutions
must provide the CNBV.154 Armed with this consistent and uniform financial informa-
tion, off-site supervisors are able to create individual, comparative or sectoral analyses of a
financial institution's performance and develop "early-warning mechanisms that make it
possible to detect in a timely manner any risks that may undermine the institution's finan-
cial position." 155 These techniques, the CNBV predicts, will allow the agency "to detect
atypical behaviors, whether individual or systemic, and ... [address them] before they
reach critical levels."156
The Institutional Program contemplates a new structure for the system of internal
and external audits which "complement" the supervision of financial institutions by the
CNBV. 57 There has been some trouble with external auditors in Mexico. The Institutional
Program recommends that external auditors be registered, that CNBV evaluate their per-
formance and opinions, and impose sanctions if required. 158 The Institutional Program
also recommends that internal auditors should report directly to a financial institution's
board of directors, rather than the intermediate management of the institution, and that
the CNBV supervise internal auditors by examining the scope and regularity of audits,
audit procedures, and the content of internal audit reports. 15 9
Finally, the Institutional Program recognizes the importance of strengthening world
confidence in Mexico's financial institutions by providing foreign financial authorities
with quality financial information, in international terms, so that those authorities may
measure Mexican institution's exposure to risk. 160 Along this line, the Institutional
150. See id. at 9.
151. See id. at 8-9.





157. See id. at 10.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 11.
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Program promotes "greater cooperation with foreign authorities and multilateral organi-
zations" such as the International Organization of Securities Regulators, the Latin
American and Caribbean Association of Banking Supervisors, and the Basle
Committee. 16 1
c. Market Self-Regulation and Corrective Action.
The Institutional Program recognizes the need to ensure that prudential regulation
does not "replace the disciplines and sanctions imposed by the market on [financial insti-
tutions] which do not follow sound financial practices or take excessive risks."'162 The
objective of the Institutional Program is to encourage financial institutions to regulate
themselves through "codes of ethics and behavior that are consistent with sound financial
practices, and the necessary mechanisms for assuring they are complied with."163 It also
encourages the development of non-governmental financial data-compiling institutions,
such as credit rating agencies, to help "improve the quality and timeliness of the informa-
tion and, on the other hand, enable markets and those participating in them ... to assimi-
late this information quickly without having to pay a high price for it.'164
In order to correct instances of inappropriate behavior by financial institutions, the
CNBV has developed an array of corrective measures including corrective and mandatory
compliance programs and, in extreme cases, interventions in the administration and man-
agement of financial institutions. 165 In order to achieve greater compliance, the CNBV
intends to revise these measures "to assure that sanctions are such that they really dissuade
behavior and actions that are counter to sound financial practices?'1 6 6
d. Other Objectives of the CNBV.
The Institutional Program highlights several other objectives in addition to those
relating to the stability and solvency of Mexico's financial system as a whole. Those objec-
tives include: protecting the interests of depositors and investors, fostering improved quali-
ty of management among financial institutions, fostering the efficient and sound develop-
ment of the financial system, and strengthening the CNBV's institutional development. 167
In order to enhance the protection of depositors and investors, the Institutional
Program recommends implementing measures improving (1) the extensive, clear and
timely disclosure of financial data, (2) the regulation of insider information, (3) the effec-
tiveness of deposit insurance programs, (4) the regulation of conflicts of interest, (5) the
sophistication of the general public in its use of financial services, and (6) the attention by
financial institutions to the needs of consumers. 168 The CNBV intends to improve the




164. See id. at 12.
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166. See id.
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for the authorization of individuals to establish financial institutions and created a corpo-
rate governance scheme that more efficiently limits excesssive risk taking. 169 The agency
hopes to promote a sound and efficient financial system by facilitating (1) the develop-
ment of more and improved savings and financial instruments, (2) the expansion of the
availability of financial resources to a wide base of financial institutions, (3) increased
competition among financial institutions, (4) the restructuring of the financial system in
the wake of the system's reform, and (5) development of an efficient and speedy judicial
system. 170 Finally, the CNBV's own institutional development priorities include: (1)
implementation of a comprehensive planning system, (2) development of a highly special-
ized, technically trained career civil service within the CNBV, and (3) development of
modern information infrastructure systems.171
2. Effect of Prudential Regulation and Supervision Improvements.
Although the CNBV program demonstrates that significant concrete measures have
been taken to improve prudential regulation and supervision in the Mexican banking sys-
tem, much of the program represents mere "goals" which may or may not be actually
achieved. Still, the overhaul of Mexico's system of financial institution regulation and the
accomplishments and objectives of the CNBV present serious efforts by Mexico to regain
world confidence in its financial institutions. These efforts appear to have born some success.
In Semptember 1996, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (the Board) approved the applica-
tion of a Mexican financial group, Grupo Financiero Banamex Accival (Banacci), to become
a bank holding company, under the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act, 172 and to engage in
securities activities including brokerage services, private placement, and risldess principal
activities. 173 In order to approve Banacci's application to establish a bank holding company,
the Board had to determine that the foreign bank is subject to comprehensive supervision or
regulation on a consolidated basis by its home country supervisor. 174 Prior to its decision,
the Board received comments protesting the application and asserting that home country
supervision of Banacci was insufficient to justify the Board's approval.175
Per Federal Reserve Board regulations, a foreign bank is subject to comprehensive
supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis if "its home country supervisor receives
sufficient information on the foreign bank's worldwide operations, including its relation-
ship to any affiliate, to assess the foreign bank's overall financial condition and compliance
with law and regulation."176 Factors considered by the Board include the extent to which
169. See id. at 16-17.
170. See id. at 16- 18.
171. See id. at 18-20.
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (1994).
173. See Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving the Formation of a Bank Holding Company and a
Proposal to Engage in Certain Securities Activities, Grupo Financiero Banamex Accival, S.A. de
C.V., Mexico City, Mexico, et al. (Sept. 9, 1996) [hereinafter Banacci Order].
174. This determination is required by the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3)(B)
(1994), and Federal Reserve Board Regulation Y, 12 C.ER. 225.13(a)(4) (1993).
175. See Banacci Order, supra note 173, at n.5.
176. Id. at 3.
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the home country supervisor: (i) ensures that the foreign bank has adequate procedures
for monitoring and controlling its activities worldwide; (ii) obtains information on the
condition of the foreign bank and its subsidiaries and offices outside the home country
through regular reports of examination, audit reports, or otherwise; (iii) obtains informa-
tion on the dealings and relationships between the foreign bank and its affiliates, both for-
eign and domestic; (iv) receives from the foreign bank financial reports that are consoli-
dated on a worldwide basis, or comparable information that permits analysis of the for-
eign bank's financial condition on a worldwide, consolidated basis; and (v) evaluates pru-
dential standards, such as capital adequacy and risk asset exposure, on a worldwide
basis.177 Based on its evaluation of these factors, the Board concluded that Banacci was
subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis by Mexico's National
Banking and Securities Commission, the CNBV, its home country supervisor responsible
for enforcing Mexico's banking and securities laws. 178
The Board specifically referred to the CNBV's substantial revision of Mexico's banking
supervisory framework through the "issuance of supervisory and regulatory requirements
that seek to ensure the safe and sound operations of Mexican banks."179 Recent regulatory
measures taken by the CNBV and noted by the Board include:
(1) improvement in the quality of required regulatory financial reporting; (2)
strengthening the monitoring of bank's conditions by conducting annual on-site
examinations that focus on risk management and management information sys-
tems; (3) changes in the asset classification process and related loan loss reserve
calculation to provide a better assessment of asset quality; and (4) promotion of
a closer exchange of information with foreign supervisory authorities. 180
The Board also noted the "Financial Technical Assistance Program" between Mexico and the
World Bank as well as the pending revision of Mexico's accounting standards to conform with
international accounting standards. 18 1
Analyzing other issues related to approval, the Board found that Banacci's capitaliza-
tion exceeded the minimum standards in the Basle Accord, and that although Banacci suf-
fered asset quality problems following the 1994 financial crisis, Mexico's loan restructuring
program (UDI) and loan purchase/recapitalization programs (PROCAPTE) slowed the
deterioration in its asset quality and improved its capitalization.18 2
177. See 12 C.ER. 211.24(c)(1) (1993); see also Banacci Order, supra note 173, at 3-4.
178. See Banacci Order, supra note 173, at 5.
179. See id. at 4.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 4-5.
182. See id. at 6.
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VII. Conclusion.
Although its financial system is still troubled, the opening of Mexico's financial mar-
kets to foreign competition and the recapitalization and asset quality programs imple-
mented in 1995 appear to have stabilized its banking system. Perhaps equally significant,
the creation of the CNBV and the development of a program for enhancing prudential
regulation and supervision of Mexico's banking system demonstrate measures which may
ultimately cure problems with inadequate capitalization and nonperforming loans. The
U.S. Federal Reserve Board's approval of the Banacci Order indicates that the international
community is regaining confidence in the Mexican banking system. Although Mexico's
financial system remains a long way from developed country standards of soundness and
stability, Mexico finally appears to have begun implementing the policies necessary to ulti-
mately achieve those standards.
